Statistics tragic, most definitely an objective Bayesian style statistician. I find myself quite compelled by the "probability as extended logic" philosophy, particularly the work of Edwin Jaynes. I have also derived on of the most important rules ever: BAYESIAN+JAYNES=JAYNESIAN. lol. But seriously, I am in awe of this guy: he is like the "Jesus" of statistical thinking.
I also quite dislike the use of the word "prior beliefs" which gets attach to prior probabilities in the Bayesian world. It brings over the wrong connotations - I think "prior assumptions" or "prior state of knowledge" better describes what is actually encapsulated by "the prior" of Bayesian statistics.
Which is worse: a frequentist who refuses to use prior's (but is happy to assume a likelihood) or a subjective Bayesian who claims that they can be whatever you "believe"?