Johan, your excellent question has two aspects:
- positive -- Why do people actually do that?
- normative -- What should one do?
Frank Harrell has answered the normative question; I would like to weigh in on the positive aspect.
I suspect most users of statistics have accustomed themselves to an artificial distinction between prediction and estimation, which is supposed to make the latter somehow less exacting. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson's quip about being condemned to hang, "Depend upon it, sir, when a statistician knows a prediction is due in a fortnight, it concentrates the mind wonderfully." Like being hanged, the 'moment of prediction' seems very real indeed. Prediction has an obvious and unavoidable connection with the real world and with real costs, such as might be described by a custom-built loss function. Even for a prediction task that has not been fully worked-out in decision-theoretic terms, the statistician usually has some intuitive sense that a real cost will be borne (by someone) if the prediction is made with a large error.
By contrast, estimation may seem to be happening on an entirely different plane -- in some etherial realm of ideas and abstractions. Except when the estimation task has been explicitly cast in decision-theoretic terms, that 'mind-focusing' connection with reality is simply not as obvious. Seeing this connection in the case of estimation requires connecting the dots to what people (including you) will believe after they read your analysis, what they will do acting under those beliefs, and what harms will ensue if those beliefs are wrong.
But as demonstrated e.g. in Christian Robert's The Bayesian Choice 2nd ed (2007), it is possible to put prediction and estimation on equal footing by regarding them both as decisions -- whether about what value to choose as 'the prediction' or what value to choose as 'the estimate'. Either way, the decision-theoretic formulation explicitly connects these choices with their consequences.
In brief: the decision-theoretic perspective unifies the tasks of 'prediction' and 'estimation', demonstrating that there is no essential difference and thereby underscoring Frank Harrell's normative answer. The positive answer comes in the form: "because in estimation tasks, people are accustomed to employing standard, off-the-shelf loss functions (e.g., quadratic loss) that allow them to sidestep a realistic assessment and specification of a loss function properly adapted to their particular problem."