Laplace smoothing has a generalisation that can be justified with the use of Bayes formula. Let $f(x;\alpha,\beta)$ be the (non-normalised) beta distribution, i.e. $$f(x;\alpha,\beta) = x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1},\qquad\alpha,\beta\in\mathbb R^+.$$ Note that we can still consider $f(x;0,0)$ and we will, but this is not normalisable. In all the other cases, the normalisation constant is the Beta function $B(\alpha,\beta)$. Let $\pi$ be a probability parameter that we want to estimate and assume that we have $N$ conditionally independent trials of the same binary random variable $x$. We then have $$p(x|\pi) = \prod_{i=1}^N\pi^{x_i}(1-\pi)^{1-x_i} = \pi^s(1-\pi)^{n-s}$$ where $$s = \sum_{i=1}^Nx_i.$$ For the prior probability we choose $p(\pi;\alpha) = f(\pi;\alpha,\alpha)$, which is improper for $\alpha = 0$. The posterior probability is thus given by $$p(\pi|x;\alpha) = \frac{\pi^{s+\alpha-1}(1-\pi)^{n-s+\alpha-1}}{B(s+\alpha, n-s+\alpha)}.$$ If we now take the conditional expectation of $\pi$ as an estimator for $\pi$, we then get to $$E_{\pi|x;\alpha}[\pi] = \frac{s+\alpha}{n+2\alpha}.$$ We then see that, with $\alpha = 1$ we recover the Laplace smoothing. In this case, the prior $p(\pi;\alpha)$ is uniform. The case $\alpha = 0$ is the result that one would expect without Laplace smoothing. However, the prior is improper in this case.
The question is then: what is the interpretation for the priors? In the case $\alpha = 1$ we get a uniform distribution, meaning that every value of $\pi$ is equally probable. In fact, it doesn't even matter if we then define the prior to vanish on 0 and 1, we would still get Laplace smoothing. Given that we know nothing about $\pi$, any choice is as good as any, but I guess the uniformity hypothesis is quite a natural one.
The case $\alpha = 0$ is even more interesting, since the prior is improper. Whilst not a probability density, one can still look at its shape and conclude that we are modelling $\pi$ to either be 0 or 1 with high probability, and any intermediate value with lower probability. This is not quite like saying that we allow for the impossible and certain cases as well as the others, because in fact we are expressing a propensity towards these two edge cases rather than anything in between.