I'm looking at question 4 section 3 from this problem set, bottom of page 2.
Repeated (more succinctly) here:
There is a prize $V \sim \text{Unif}[0, 1]$ measured in millions of dollars. You can choose to bid any amount $b$ (in millions of dollars). If $b < \frac{2}{3}V$, then the bid is rejected and nothing is gained or lost. If $b \geq \frac{2}{3}V$, then the bid is accepted and your net payoff is $V-b$.
What is your optimal bid $b$ (to maximize the expected payoff)?
Let's call the payoff $X$.
I have solved this in two ways, both inspired by drawing a picture of the payoff. Sparing too many details one way it occurred to me to solve it was by calculating:
$$\int_0^{\frac{3b}{2}}(V-b) \, dV$$
but having read the solution (which I found confusing) I'm struggling to translate the above "intuitive" quantity into slightly more formal conditional expectation notation.
In other words: I knew that calculating the above (simple) integral was the right thing to do but unless I can formalise why it was a valid thing to do I'm wondering if it was an accident or not, and am unsatisfied.
So my question is: why is the expected payoff, $E[X]$, equal to the above integral?