Definitions are not just characterised or judged by their correctness/accuracy. They need to be as precise as possible to be maximally useful. The problem with your definition is that it is vague in multiple respects, and arguably self-contradictory. 'usually asserts' and 'nothing special' are ambiguous and imprecise. Even worse, usually implies exceptions, which essentially undermines the whole definition - are there null hypotheses that this does not apply to? What characterises/defines those? And 'happening' is both ambiguous and irrelevant to many possible applications of the term.
It can be helpful for our own understanding to come up with loose explanations of terms in simple language that we can grapple with. But this is a step towards deeper understanding, and we should not mistake it for a rigorous definition.
As a mild caveat to what I wrote above, many fields do use definitions (or 'working definitions') that do have exceptions. Biology famously still doesn't have an unambiguous and universally applicable definition of what a 'species' is. But that's in large part because a 'species' is a construct that maps only loosely onto reality. It is an attempt to put hard boundaries on reality when reality itself is more porous (as the phenomenon of fertile hybrids of different species shows). This looseness is much less justifiable when dealing with mathematical (and most statistical) constructs. Where greater precision is possible, we should aim for it.