Timeline for Intuition about the deep meaning of Bayesian priors and its influence on posteriors
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
4 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 29, 2018 at 0:18 | comment | added | jbowman | No, no! Arbitrary priors that are close to reality are much better than no priors at all! It's very roughly analogous to saying "243.19092 x 43.989 is approximately equal to 10,000"; sure, 10,000 isn't exactly right, but it's a lot better than just saying "some number greater than 243." And... frequentist tests are known to be fundamentally incoherent in a way which Bayesian tests are not. | |
| Apr 29, 2018 at 0:00 | comment | added | Courtney Kristensen | I acknowledge there seems to also Bayesian process, which has seperate and independent value to the "issues" or "controversy" about the priors (or does it, since it is so integrally linked?). | |
| Apr 28, 2018 at 23:59 | comment | added | Courtney Kristensen | It seems like your post essentially agrees with my "critique" that the posteriors are arbitrary. To me, this seems to be saying that philosophically this is no better than just the frequentist approach and its use of normal distributions, except for some corner cases where priors do matter (and even then it seems like these unusual priors are subject to handwaving and "politics"). | |
| Apr 28, 2018 at 3:48 | history | answered | jbowman | CC BY-SA 3.0 |