First, answers in this thread (already linked in the question) are very informative, and much that can be said is there.
I just add the rather "metastatistical" consideration that any possible "proof" would have to depend on a definition of what "truly uninformative" actually means, and there is no generally accepted such definition. If you look at the linked thread but also this paper (Kass, R. E., & Wasserman, L. (1996). The Selection of Prior Distributions by Formal Rules. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91(435), 1343–1370. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1996.10477003; freely available in many places), a good number of such definitions have been proposed. As long as you accept one of these definitions, you can find "uninformative" priors in many situations, however the general argument is that something that is "uninformative" according to one definition is informative according to another. In particular one can have good arguments that any such definition doesn't exclude everything that we would reasonably call "informative" in non-mathematical terms, and therefore no existing definition qualifies as actually defining "truly uninformative".
The thing here is that if you wanted to prove that "a truly uninformative prior doesn't exist", you'd need a mathematical definition of "truly uninformative", and this doesn't exist because there is no agreement (for good reasons) that any existing definition of "uninformative in some sense" could deliver such a thing.
Maybe the simplest argument would be that whatever is implied by a prior (and be it uniformity) is some kind of information. You may not be happy with that, but any attempt at a mathematical definition of "uninformative" doesn't make this very simple consideration go away.