I was thinking about CI and subjective Bayesian and I have following two questions:
If a subjective (not objective) Bayesian would care if her predictions don't do well in the real world.
A classical statistician would not care if her confidence statement is (obviously) wrong for a given data set (as in Welch's Paradox, where conditioning is on ancillary statistics leads to the resolution of pathological behavior).
I think my answer for 1. is YES and 2. is NO.
But I don't know if I am thinking along the right lines. Can I have some more insights?
UPDATE
Welch's example: This example works for any $n$, but we will take $n=2$ for simplicity. $X_1, X_2 \sim U(\theta - 1/2, \theta +1/2)$ (iid), $\theta \in R$. This implies $X_1 - \theta \sim U(-1/2, 1/2)$ (iid). $(X_1 + X_2) /2 - \theta$ (note that this is NOT a statistic) has a distribution independent of $\theta$. We can choose c > 0 s.t. $Prob_{\theta} [-c \le (X_1 + X_2) /2 - \theta \le c] = 1- \alpha (~0.99)$, implying $((X_1 + X_2) /2 - c, (X_1 + X_2) /2 + c)$ is the 99% CI of $\theta$. The interpretation of this CI is: if we sample repeatedly, we will get different $(X_1 + X_2) /2$ and (at least) 99% times it will contain true \theta. But for a particular set of $X_1, X_2$, we can't say if the CI contains $\theta$. Now, consider the following data: $X_1 =0$ and $X_2=1$, as $|X_1 - X_2|=1$, we know FOR SURE (Prob =1) that the interval $(X_1, X_2)$ contains theta (one possible criticism, $P{|X_1 - X_2|=1} = 0$, but we can handle it mathematically and I won't discuss it). (Better details are in Pratt, 1961; Lehman, Chap 10, 2nd Edition, Prob 27, 28; Kiefer, 1977; Berger and Wolpert, 1988)
Thanks,
S.